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MARKET DEFINITION

MARKET DEFINITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
By

GEORGE

R.

HALL*'

Only in the last two decades has market definition been a serious
concern for antitrust law.2 Judges and lawyers involved with antitrust suits have always had to consider "lines of commerce." As long
as antimonopoly policy was primarily concerned with exclusionary
and predatory behavior, however, market definition was a minor problem. Today the situation is vastly different. Most antitrust cases involve
the definition and determination of the effective area of competition:
court decisions use economic concepts such as "cross elasticity of demand," legal journals discuss economic theories, and economic jour3

nals discuss judicial analyses.
This change is due to two developments. The first is the stress now
placed by the courts on "market power" as the key element of illegal
monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act.4 Since in order to de*Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Virginia. B.A. 1951, Claremont Men's College, M.A. Harvard University 1953, Ph.D. Harvard University 196o.
1
The author received valuable advice and assistance from Carl Kaysen, Almarin
Phillips, and Charles F. Phillips, Jr. The Wilson Gee Institute of the University of
Virginia provided assistance. Any errors and all opinions remain the sole responsibility of the author.
-This paper is concerned with attempts to convert economic theory into judicial
findings and therefore the economic literature on the theory of markets will not
be considered. For standard treatments of the economic problems involved see:
Chamberlin, Monopoly and Competition and their Regulation, 255 (1954);
Marshall, Principles of Economics, 325 (8th ed. 1947); Stigler, The Theory of Price,
92 (1947); Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory
(1940); Bishop, Elasticities, Cross Elasticities and Market Relationships, 42 Am.
Econ. Rev. 779 (1952); Pfouts & Ferguson, Market Classification Systems in Theory
and Practice, 26 South. Econ. Rev. nii (1959).
3
For discussions of the legal problems of market definitions see:
Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 44 (1955); Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust
Policy ioo (1959); Note, the Market: A Concept in Antitrust, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
580 (1954); Connelly, Emerging Theories of Mergers Extra Ed. Trade Reg.
Rep. (196o); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act of the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (196o); Hale & Hale, Monopoly in Motion: Dynamic
Economics in Antitrust Enforcement, 41 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1955); Handler and Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 Colum.
L. Rev. 629 (1961).
426 Stat. 2o9; 15 U.S.C. 1-7; Public, No. 19o (i8go). Section 2 reads in part:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
coihmerce among the several States or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor..."

48

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

termine if a firm has the power to dominate a market-monopolize
it-one must know the relevant boundaries of the industry, market
definition has become a central issue in monopoly litigation. The
second development is due to the "New Section 7," the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment of 195o to section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 This amendment was designed to strengthen the ability of the federal government to stop mergers. It closed the loophole in the previous section
7 which had exempted asset transactions from the antimerger pro-.
visions. At the same time the amendment established more stringent
tests of mergers. The result has been an active program of antimerger
enforcement by both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission. In turn -this meant that the courts had to interpret "line
of commerce" and "section of the country," key phrases in the amendment. This necessitates judicial definition of markets.
Both section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton
Act are concerned with monopoly.6 The former attempts to deal with
those situations in which a large firm has the ability to control or
determine prices, outputs, or other economic dimensions of competition. The latter forbids certain practices which may lead to or increase market power in 'the Sherman Act sense. The justification for
the Clayton Act is that it is easier to correct situations before they
develop than it is to change long-standing business practices or industrial organizations. That is, it is easier .to prevent eggs being broken
than 'to unscramble an omelet.
Although market definition plays a role in litigation under both
statutes, there is considerable confusion about whether. the criteria applicable under one law should apply under the other. This paper, there'38 Stat. 730; 15 U.S.C. 12 ff; Public, no. 212 (1914) as amended by Celler- Kefauver Act, Dec. 29, 195o, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S.C. 18; Public Law 899. The revelant
part of section 7 reads as follows with material in italics added by the CellerKefauver Amendment and material in parenthesis deleted by the amendment:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporationsubject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be (to)
substantially to lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to tend to create a monopoly (or any line of commerce)."
'Although market definition problems can arise under other sections of the
anti-trust laws they most frequently occur under sections 2 of the Sherman Act and
7 of the Clayton Act. Therefore, this paper will be limited to these sections. For
convenience, "Sherman Act" and "Clayton Act" when used in the text will refer to
sections 2 and 7 respectively.
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fore, will first consider how the courts define markets in Sherman
Act cases, then consider how they define markets in Clayton Act
cases and finally discuss the relationships between the two procedures.
I.

MARKET DEFINITION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN

ACT

Current doctrine about market definition under the Sherman Act
was established in a series of important cases decided between 1945
and 1955, in which it was held that a decision about monopolization
requires a definition of the market and that an economic analysis of
substitution is required for this task. The most important case was
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America;7 but as Judge Hand's
decision is so well known, extensive consideration of -this suit is unnecessary. Hand's emphasis on market domination as the essence of
monopoly brought the determination of market boundaries to the
center of the stage. His defintion of the aluminum market introduced
what has come to be known as the "functional interchangeability" doctrine, that is, the market is composed of all those products which can
perform certain consumer-demanded services. Virgin and secondary
aluminum were considered by Hand to be functionally interchangeable although he excluded secondary in computing Alcoa's market
share on the questionable grounds that Alcoa's control over virgin
aluminum necessarily gave it control over secondary. The Alcoa case
therefore, is significant both because of the importance it gave to market definition and the approach it used in delineating the area of competition.
The Hand approach was broadened in the Alcoa Remedy case,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,8 handed down five years
later. Judge Knox took the position that the relevant market for
aluminum was composed of all sources of supply for the major fabricated aluminum products. He defined the market by looking at the
fabrication of end use products and deciding which sources of supply
were technologically substitutable at no major cost disadvantage. This
allowed the exclusion of other "light metals" but the inclusion of
secondary aluminum and scrap. Secondary aluminum was included
because Knox felt that the war and the existence of Reynolds and
Kaiser prohibited control by Alcoa, and because the court concluded
that from the standpoint of fabricators there was little difference between primary and secondary. The latter conclusion was partly based
on evidence that secondary aluminum had sold at higher prices than
"t146 F.-d

416 (2d. Cir. 1945).

Sg1 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 195o).
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primary on several occasions. Knox held that Reynold's and Kaiser's
use of most of their own ingot production did not eliminate them as
potential competitors of Alcoa. He ruled out a measurement of the
market limited to sales of ingot and pig aluminum. 9
The market definition used in the Remedy case was based on a recognition of both technological possibilities and price relationships,
but other courts have differed frequently in the relative emphasis to
be placed on these two aspects of substitution. Differences in the
stress placed on one or the other element can lead to very great differences in market definitions as is evident from United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., and Cellophane case.' 0 This decision is
fundamental for it firmly established that market definition is an
economic problem and can not be solved by legal, historical, or conventional classifications of firms. The functional interchangeability
doctrine was elaborated also and stated to be necessary for a finding of
monopolization.
During the trial there was a lengthy dispute about how the market
for cellophane should be defined. The defense argued that one could
not consider cellophane without also considering substitutes. The
government contended, on the other hand, that a single product could
be considered a line of commerce under the antitrust laws. Counsel for
the government stated that "the facts [about substitutes] that the defendant desires to prove are entirely against the express intent of Congress."" He went on to say that "there [has] been a single product in
a line of commerce and substitutes have been disregarded again and
again."'12 He argued that if the court were to consider substitutes it
would be required to "wade through this great mass of detail, ... the
statistics and the trivia that was dumped in with it" only -to reach
the conclusion that the search had been useless and that any product
could comprise a market. 13 Judge Leahy analyzed and rejected this
argument in a trial memorandum.14 He ruled that market definition
must be made on the basis of economic analysis and not on conventional classifications. The final decision followed this reasoning and
rested on the finding that there were many substitutes for cellophane
because of the functional interchangeability of wrapping materials.
Old. at 357-358.

10118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).

uRecord at 1546-47.
2Ibid.
"Record at 1545.
uRecord, Fifth Trial Memorandum.
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The relevant market was held to be the "flexible wrapping industry."
Judge Leahy concluded:
The record establishes plain cellophane and moistureproof
cellophane are each flexible packaging materials which are
functionally interchangeable with other flexible packaging materials and sold at same time to same customers for same purpose at competitive prices; there is no cellophane market distinct and separate from the market for flexible packaging
materials...15
This conclusion has been subjected to severe criticism.16 The significant price differentials between cellophane and other wrappings
and the ability of cellophane prices to change independently of other
wrapping material prices indicates that the "flexible packaging materials market" included some heterogeneous commodities. Judge
Leahy's approach can be attributed partly to the stress in the du Pont
arguments on technical and engineering data about substitution.
Because the government argued that market definition was unnecessary,
it never presented an alternative theory of how the market should be
defined. As is so often the situation, "something" beat "nothing." On
the appeal of this decision the government made a persuasive analysis of the market boundaries based on price relationships. The majority
of the Supreme Court, nevertheless, was unwilling to reserve the
District Court findings about the nature of the market.
As laid down in Cellophane the functional interchangeability doctrine theoretically involves both technical relationships and "competitive prices." Academic criticism of -this decision has mainly charged
that in the decision the latter were ignored and that the market derived from the former overstated the economic alternatives available
to packagers. A number of other cases have also presented the courts
with a choice of technical or price-quantity data on which to base a
market definition. A particularly interesting example of judicial handling of substitution possibilities is Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co. 17
The suit concerned infringement of patents held by Kobe on hydraulic
bottom pumps for oil wells. Dempsey, another manufacturer of such
pumps, in a counter claim for treble damages charged Kobe with
violating the Sherman Act. To establish the validity of this claim it
was necessary that the market be limited to hydraulic pumps and not
include all oil well pumps. The parties agreed that many types of
F. Supp at 194.
-Stocking and Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45

2i18

Am. Econ. Rev.

29

(1955).

1197 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Okla. 1951), affd 198 F. 2d 416 (ioth Cir. 1952).
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pumps were satisfactory for shallow wells, but that in deep wells hydraulic pumps had substantial advantages, even though other types
of pumps could be used. Kobe argued for a broad definition of the
market because many wells used other types of pumps. Kobe introduced
a journal article by three soil engineers on costs of pumps in deep
wells as evidence that substitution between different types was possible.18 Dempsey argued that in deep wells ,the cost advantage of hydraulic pumps was so great that other types of pumps could not be
considered substitutes. The court agreed with Dempsey and ruled
that the relevant market was for wells below 8,ooo feet where hydraulic
pumps had few substitutes.
On the appeal this definition was disputed and-Kobe charged that
to accept such a definition would be to say that "any produce with
any differentiation" was a line of commerce. Kobe pointed out that
only 1 per cent of all oil wells were "deep wells" and of -these only
2o per cent were on artificial lift with only part of these using hydraulic pumps.19 The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the district court. It held that the Sherman Act does not require that an entire
industry be monopolized before action can be taken but requires only
that an appreciable part be controlled.
The Hughes cases, 20 which also involved the substitutability of
drilling equipment, present an opportunity to observe how jurists may
treat the same facts differently. Judge Vaught decided the Cole and
Conaghan cases and Judge Wallace decided the Ford case. However,
all three cases were tried together. Hughes won the Cole and Conaghan
cases and lost the Ford case. All three cases went -to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit where a majority of four held for Hughes
in all three cases. One justice dissented saying he agreed "precisely"
with Judge Wallace.
The cases involved a charge by Hughes that its patents had been
infringed and a counterclaim by the defendants that Hughes had
monopolized the market for roller-rock drilling bits.
Drillers use a number of types of bits but in deep formations
"roller-rock" bits are much preferred. Such bits are of two types: cone
and cross. Cone roller-rock bits are manufactured by the Hughes Tool
Company and leased to drillers with the requirement that when worn
2'Record at 670; Plaintiff's Exhibit 78.
2"Brief of Appellants, 1o Cir. 34.
mCole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F. 2d 924 (ioth Cir. 1954); Hughes Tool Co. v.
Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525 (D. Okla. 1953); Hughes Tool Go. v. Conaghan, 113 F. Supp.
519 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hughes Tool Co. v. Cole, iiB F. Supp. 527 (W.D. Okla.

1953).
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they are to be returned to Hughes. The defendants were "retippers"
who obtained worn bits, built up the teeth by welding, and resold
them. Retipped bits are usually used in nonrock formations. Hughes
argued that due to the competition of other types of bits in the softer
formations, the market should not be limited to roller-rock bits. The
retippers' position was that:
It is manifest that the roller-rock bit is distinct physically, performance-wise, commercially and in utility from any other drill
bit... and in consequence it is legally distinguished as a separate commodity or article of trade for -the purpose of the antitrust laws 21
Judge Wallace in Hughes Tool Co. v. Ford held that all rollerrock bits are sufficiently interchangeable to constitute the same market
but that -the design and function distinguished roller-rock bits from
other drilling tools. 22 In the other two cases, Judge Vaught held that

whatever the market boundaries might be, Hughes' position -therein
was legal because it fell within the exemption of the Alcoa "thrust
upon" doctrine. 23 The Court of Appeals indicated that the relevant
market might be broader than that for roller-rock bits, but held that
Judge Vaught was correct in holding that any monopoly power enjoyed by Hughes was exempt because it resulted from patents, effi24
ciency and technical progress.
The same year as the federal district courts used narrow market
definitions in the Kobe and Hughes cases, the Supreme Court used an
exceedingly broad concept of substitution to define the market in
Times-Picayune PublishingCo. v. United States. 25 This litigation concerned newspaper advertising in New Orleans, where there was one
morning newspaper, the Times-Picayune, and two evening papers, the
States, and the Item. The Times-Picayune owned the States and instituted a policy charging one combined advertising rate for both morning and evening papers. The government charged this violated the
Sherman Act by preventing advertisers from splitting their space purchases between the Times-Picayune and the Item.
During the trial, discussion centered around whether the States
was a separate paper or an evening edition of the Times-Picayune.
Judge Christenberry held, on the basis of letters, reports, advertising,
etc., that the papers were separate and ruled for the government.
21Opening brief for Ford, Cole and Conaghan, ioth Cir. 63.
114 F. Supp. at 538.
2" 3 F. Supp. at 523.
24215 F.2d at 937.
'345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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During the trial several witnessess had argued that the publisher
was selling readers rather than newspaper space.2 6 The Times-Picayune
on -the appeal made this the major contention, asserting that advertisers were concerned only with -the milline rate, the cost of reaching
a million people with one line of advertising. Therefore, the argument
went, it was irrelevant whether .the publisher sold the advertiser separate morning and evening groups of readers or combined them in a
package. The Supreme Court decision turned on this point. It held:
Although advertising space in 'the Times-Picayune, as 'the sole
morning daily, was doubtless essential to blanket coverage of the
local newspaper readership, nothing in the record suggests that
advertisers viewed the city's newspaper readers, morning or evening, as other than fungible customer potential. We must assume, therefore, that the readership "bought" by advertisers
in the Times-Picayune was the selfsame "product" sold by the
States, and, for that matter, the Item. 27
So defined the Times-Picayune controlled 40 per cent of the market
as opposed to the one-third share it would have had if the newspapers
had been equal. The court held this was not market domination.
Ignoring the validity of the finding that newspaper readers are
"fungible" it is dear that the explicit market definition advanced by
the defendant carried more weight with the Supreme Court than the
evidence advanced by the government. The latter relied upon letters,
memoranda, etc., in which the Times-Picayune executives spoke of
the two papers as being separate, while the Supreme Court based its
decision on a theoretical analysis. The Supreme Court's decision
underlined the Cellophane verdict; market definition is not a matter
of statutory definition, or of conventional or historical ways of classifying industries but it is an economic fact to be determined by logical
analysis and empirical observation of substitution. Though it seems
questionable that the evening newspaper readers were true substitutes for morning newspaper readers, the principle was laid down
that substitutability is -the issue.
Examination of these cases shows that the test used in section 2
cases does not necessarily yield a "narrow" or "broad" definition of
the market. If, as in Cellophane and Times-Picayune, attention is
limited solely to 'the engineering or technical possibilities for substitution, then the "functional interchangeability" doctrine will likely
result in a relevant market 'that includes a large number of suppliers
or products. If, however, the cost of making the technically possible
2'Record at 94-98.
2345 U.S. at 61S.
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substitutes is also considered, the relevant market cannot be broader
and often will be more narrow. The "functional interchangeability"
doctrine allows for two interpretations of substitution. In terms of the
outcome of any single suit the vital question is how the courts will interpret the price relations between possible substitutes.
The role of market definition in Sherman Act cases can be summarized in three propositions. First, it has been clearly established
that before a firm can be held to have monopolized a market the
boundaries of that market must be established on the basis of economic principles. Second, the criterion for determining the extent of
the market is the degree of possible substitution-the functional interchangeability. Third, in some suits the cost of substitution as well as
technical substitution possibilities have been considered; in other suits
functional interchangeability has been regarded as almost exclusively
an engineering problem.
II. MARKET

DEFINITION UNDER SECTION

7

OF THE CLAYTON

Aar

Judge Weinfeld's decision in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation28 presents in clear form the present confusion about whether
a "market" under ,the Sherman Act is the same as a "market" under
the Clayton Act. In determining whether -the proposed merger between
Bethlehem and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. was legal. Judge
Weinfeld emphasized the necessity to determine the relevant market of
the two firms. Much of his decision is devoted to a consideration of the
economics of the steel industry and the theoretical problems involved
in measuring markets.
The defendants argued that they were not "competitive" but "complementary" and therefore the merger would not lessen competition.
They held that the relevant line of commerce should be decided by use
of the "production flexibility" concept, another name for the functional interchangeability rule discussed in the last section The government
argued on the basis of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
(the General Motors case), that "a line of commerce is any product or
group of products that has peculiar characteristics and uses, which
make it distinguishable from all other products.

' 29

Each side advanced

9168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
OId. at 589. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957), (the General Motors case), the government argued that the 23 per cent of
G. M. stock owned by du Pont meant that competitors of du Pont "have a hard
road to travel" and therefore the Sherman and Clayton Acts were violated. (See
Jurisdictional Statement by the Government on Appeal, 21). The defense argued
that the boundaries of the market should be considered and that General Motors'
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both a broad and a narrow definition of the market based on the rule
it supported. For the government the broad definition included all
iron and steel producers; for the steel companies, it included only
finished steel products common to both producers. The narrow definitions divided the outputs into separate lines of end products. For
example, the government considered "hot rolled bars" and "track
spikes" as separate lines of commerce while the steel companies lumped
both these end products into a classification of "bar mill products"
which included a number of other steel commodities.
Judge Weinfeld's rejection of the "production flexibility" or "functional interchangeability" rule and his acceptance of the peculiar
characteristics and uses criterion is essential for understanding current
interpretation of the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment. He reasoned that:
Competition is not just rivalry among sellers. It is rivalry for
the custom of buyers. Also in many instances, and particularly
in ,the steel industry, it is during periods of shortage, strongly
present as rivalry among buyers for sources of supply. Thus competitive forces may move in a number of directions-buyer
against buyer; seller against seller; buyer against seller. But
however competition is defined and whatever its form or intensity, it always involves interplay among and between both
buyers and sellers. Any definition of line of commerce which ignores the buyers and focuses on what -the sellers do, or theoretically can do, is not meaningful.
The evidence establishes that the defendants' production flexibility or mill product line theory is indeed pure theory. In prac,tice steel producers have not been quick to shift from product to
product in response to demand. Moreover, the evidence establishes that the continuing relationships *between buyers and
sellers in the steel industry make such shifts unlikely.3 0
On this basis he held that:
The Court is persuaded -that the Government's position for
determining lines 6f commerce by the particular characteristics
and uses standard is sound and should be adopted.3 1
The market was defined, therefore, by the availability of substitutes
from different concerns for a product with specifiable characteristics.
The appropriate line of commerce was held to be the "iron and steel
industry" and the proposed merger was illegal considering both the
purchases were not meaningful for assessing monopoly power. The majority of the
Supreme Court agreed with the government, though the minority held that a more

detailed examination of the line of commerce involved in the purchases was
required.
m168 F. Supp. at 592.

9[bid.
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product and geographical aspects of the market. Judge Weinfeld
delineated three relevant geographical areas of competition; the northeastern United States; a four-state are within this quardrant, composed
of Ohio, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania; and each of these
four states.
To summarize, the Bethlehem case advanced -three points about
market definition under the Clayton Act. First, it is different from
market definition under the Sherman Act. Thus, Judge Weinfeld rejected the Cellophane concept of monopoly as the power to control
prices or exclude competition as irrelevant in section 7 cases, because it
is "substantial lessening of competition" which is forbidden and this
can occur without the creation of control over all reasonably interchangeable items. The decision did note that interchangeability
should be considered in assessing whether competition has been lessened, but concluded that this factor is not controlling.
Second, the applicable Clayton Act criterion is the peculiar characteristics and uses doctrine. The market is composed of those items
whose aspects set them apart from all other products.
Third, Bethlehem established three markets for steel and held each
to be relevant. Thus competition can be lessened in the meaning of
section 7 if any significant part of a broad competitive area is affected
by a merger.
Since this decision both the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have followed Judge Weinfeld's procedure. Almost every one
of the eighty-one section 7 cases instituted between 1951 and 196o
considered market boundaries and market shares of the merging firms.
Cases in which market determination was particularly important include: Brown Shoe,32 American Crystal Sugar,33 Erie Sand,34 Crown36
Zellerbach,35 Farm Journal,
Reynolds Metals,37 and Maryland and
33
Virginia Milk Producers. The first three cases will illustrate the current approach to market definition in merger cases.
United States v. Brown Shoe Company involved a proposed mer-United States v. Brown Shoe Company 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"4Erie Sand and Gravel Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 F.2d 279
(3 d Cir. 1961).
cCrown Zellerbach v. F.T.C., Trade Reg. Rep. 70038 (1961).
mFarm Journal, Inc. v. F.T.C., Docket 6338.
3'ReynoIds Metals Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 28533 (196o).
32Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 US. 458

(196o).
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ger between the Brown Shoe Company, Inc., and G. R. Kinney Corporation. Brown was principally a manufacturer, while Kinney was
primarily a shoe distributor though it did some manufacturing.
Brown, the fourth largest company in the business, produced 5 per
cent of the total U.S. shoe output and Kinney 0. 5 per cent. The government contended that the relevant market should be defined as
"shoes" or alternatively as three markets, "men's,.. "women's," and
"children's" shoes. Brown and Kinney asserted that shoes are divided
into certain grades and price lines so that the market should be composed of separate grade groups, such as "casual," "dress," etc., and
should also be subdivided into price classes.3 9
The court decided ,that:
An analysis of the maze of cases on the subject leads one to the
conclusion that a "line of commerce" cannot be determined by
any process of logic and should be determined by the process of
observation.4 0
Judge Weber reached four conclusions about functional interchangeability in shoes. First, ,the manufacturing process can be adopted
to produce a variety of types of shoes. Second, people often regard
cheap shoes as a substitute for expensive shoes. Third, there is interchangeability of the use customers make of shoes; one person may
wear "casual" shoes for work, while another person wears them for
dress. Fourth, the shoe manufacturers admitted that trade classifications do not determine use; that decision is made by consumers.41
Therefore, Judge Weber classified shoe production into three markets:
"Men's," "women's," and "children's" shoes. On the basis of findings
about the effects that the merger would have on "trends" in shoe
manufacturing, the merger was held to be illegal.4 2
Thus the definition of the market in Brown Shoe followed the
Cellophane precedent and considered interchangeability without reference ,to price relationships. It should be noted, too, that the district
court maintained that market boundaries are not a "problem of logic."
The context indicates that Weber believed that the market must be
defined on the facts in each case, and -that there is no a priori way of
determining the area of competition apart from empirical da.ta and an
understanding of 'the industry in question. This is an attitude apparent
3179 F. Supp. at 727-30.
"Od.at 7o.
"Id. at 731.
"For discussions of this case see: Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51
Amer. Econ. Rev. 236 (1961); and Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Different Views, 47 Va. L. Rev.
1014 (1961)-
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in most section 7 cases. The delineation of the market becomes a
matter involving considerable judicial discretion.
A different approach to substitution from that of Brown Shoe was
taken in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.
This case has not received the attention it deserves, but it is one of the
most interesting examples of judicial analysis of competition.
Cuban-American Sugar Company'owned 21 per cent of the stock
of American Crystal Sugar Company. The plaintiffs asked for an
injunction to keep Cuban-American from gaining control. Crystal
manufactures beet sugar; Cuban-American manufactures cane sugar.
Crystal sells in fourteen states where Colonial, Cuban-American's sales
subsidiary, does not. Cuban-American, through Colonial, sells in
eight states where Crystal has no customers. There are ten states in
which both sell. Traditionally, cane sugar sells at a higher price than
beet sugar and is used by households while beet sugar is used primarily
by industrial consumers. The case turned on whether the different
types of customers and the geographical differences meant that the
two firms operate in separate markets.
A novel approach was used to adjudicate this dispute. AmericanCrystal suggested that lists of customers of the two firms be compared.
Cuban-American objected to revealing trade secrets. A third party,
therefore, was selected to match the two lists and to submit a report
of the findings without disclosure of secrets. The court gave careful
consideration to the statistical findings. The tabulation of the customers who, at any time during the period under consideration, had
bought from both firms was particularly important.43 Both 'the number
of customers and sales volume were analyzed for two geographical
areas: a ten-state area in the midwest called the "River Territory," and
a three-state area composed of Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. On the
basis of the dollar volume of sales and the data on customers who purchased from both companies :the court concluded that the two firms
are in competition and their activities are major competitive factors in
the sugar business in the "River Territory."
The court also consi4cred the supposed quality difference between cane and beet sugar. While recognizing that to some extent cane
has a "higher degree of customer acceptance," the evidence showed a
"high degree of interchangeability." 44 At least for industrial uses
relative prices controlled decisions as to which type of sugar is purchased. Judge Dawson concluded:
'3152 F. Supp. 387 at 391.
"Id. at 398.
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To establish -that for consumer purposes cane and beet are not
interchangeable, it would be necessary to show that within a
given range of prices consumers would not shift from one to the
other. 45
Thus, unlike Brown Shoe, the market definition in American Crystal Sugar rests primarily on findings about price relationships.
Erie Sand concerned very narrow market boundaries determined by
the Federal Trade Commission. Erie Sand and Gravel Company
dredges and sells Lake Erie sand for,use in making cement. In 1955, it
purchased the other major dredging concern along Lake Erie, the Sandusky Division of Kelley Island Company. The FTC undertook to
set the merger aside. After hearings 'the Commission held that the
market is limited -to lake sand produced and sold within a twelvemile strip along Lake Erie from Buffalo, New York, to Sandusky, Ohio.
The high transportation costs for sand mean that pit and bank sand
though suitable for cement are separate commodities from lake sand.46
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found on appeal that
though pit and bank sand are also sold in the twelve-mile strip, this
had not been taken into account by the FTC. The court rejected as
inappropriate in appellate proceedings -the Commission's attempt to
redefine the market as a series of detached semi-circles along the lake.
Judge Hastie noted that functional interchangeability had to be
limited by economic costs. However, he questioned whether competition would be lessened by the merger even in the market area determined by the FTC. Consequently, the case was remanded to the
Commission for a redetermination of 'the facts.
These cases show the current unsettled state of market definition
under -the Clayton Act. In Brown Shoe, both the District and Supreme
Court made functional interchangeability the 'test and ignored price
relationships; in American Crystal Sugar, the court made a careful
analysis of price data. In Bethlehem-Youngstown the Court ruled that
the Cellophane doctrine did not apply to section 7 cases. In BethlehemYoungstown -the relevant market was defined as "iron and steel" in
the northeast quadrant of the United States; in Erie Sand the relevant
market was "lake sand" produced and sold in a twelve-mile strip
along Lake Erie. Much of -the difficulty is due to confusion about the
difference between tests for market control or monopolization in the
Sherman Act sense and tests for the substantial lessening of competition forbidden by the Clayton Act.
1id. at 399.

40291 F. 2d at 281-82.
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III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET DEFINITION

UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE CLAYTON AcT

To recapitulate, in the last twenty years two judicial doctrines about
market definition have been established. One, the functional interchangeability rule, has arisen primarily out of Sherman Act litigation
and holds that the market is composed of all items with "high cross
elasticities of demand"; in other words, all items capable of easy substitution one for the other. The other doctrine, the peculiar characteristics and uses rule, has arisen primarily out of Clayton Act litigation
and holds that the market is composed of those items whose aspects
set them apart from all other products. What relationship is there
between these two procedures for determining the relevant area of
competition?
One possible reconciliation was suggested by the Supreme Court
in the Brown case.47 It was asserted that functional interchangeability
might be used to obtain the "outer boundaries" of the market and
the submarkets revelant for section 7 cases might be determined by
other means.48 This, however, does not solve the problem. The courts
have been unanimous in holding that market definition in antitrust
cases is an economic problem. If so, the relevant market is, in Adelman's words, the "locus of the supply-demand forces that determine
price." 49 Therefore, only one rule can be valid in any specific case;
either some submarket is the locus of the forces and -the functional
interchangeability rule is irrelevant or the outer limits encompass the
forces and the peculiar characteristics and uses doctrine does not apply.
By this reasoning only one of the three markets held to be relevant
in the Bethlehem case is appropriate. Mann and Lewyn, however,
have defended Judge Weinfeld's procedure and in so doing have
suggested another possible reconciliation of the two market definition doctrines.5 0 Mann and Lewyn assert that section 7 is designed
to protect producer interests as well as consumer interests. This means
that in an industry in which each producer's output is somewhat different in form or style from all the others, markets will differ depending upon which producer's interest is being protected. 51 Thus, there
can be more than one market in a single section 7 case. Moreover,
' 71d. at 283.

"370 U.S. at 325.

"DOp. cit. supra note 42 at 237.

wOp it. supra note 42 at

1o9.

6id. at 10x8-102o. For another defense of the market definition in Bethlehem
see: Houghton, The Anatomy of a Merger, 6 Antitrust Bull. 1i3. (ig6i).
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since section 7 cases are concerned with producer's interests, they may
have different markets than those appropriate for cases arising under
the Sherman Act which protects consumer interests.
Such a position would rationalize much of the current confusion
about market definition but it is, nevertheless, unacceptable. To regard the Clayton Act and the Celler-Kefauver Amendment as protecting producer interests would negate the purpose of the statute which
is to protect competition and not consumers. The justification for
competition as a means of organizing an economy is not that it is good
for producers but that it -is good for competitors. Antitrust laws,
therefore, always should have one focal point-consumer interests.
There is no indication either in -the legislative history of .the CellerKefauver Amendment or in the cases handed down under that act
that competition is explicitly regarded as a process of protecting competitors. However, some commentators feel some recent cases have
been implicitly concerned more with producers than with consumers. 52 The'essence of competition is rivalry among businessmen for
the custom of the public and therefore any' law which protects
market positions of firms is anticompetitive. As both the Sherman Act
and Clayton Act are designed to promote such competition it is inadmissible to distinguish between them on the basis that they protect
different interests.
Of course, the two acts differ. The variation, however, is not in
the appropriate market boundaries but in -the amount of control over
the market necessary for a finding of guilty. Both statutes are designed
to prevent monopoly or market power and there is no reason why the
locus of this power should be different when a firm is setting a price
than when it is consummating a merger. However, the Sherman Act
requires that actual domination be demonstrated while the Clayton
Act requires only that there be a reasonable probability that market
power might be increased.
Although these suggested reconciliations are unsatisfactory the two
doctrines are closely related for both are concerned with substitution,
but the substitution stressed is somewhat different for each doctrine.
Under the functional changeability doctrine the court examines
the ability of buyers to vary means of production and to use alternative
products. Under the peculiar characteristics and uses doctrine the
court examines the ability of buyers to find alternative sources of supply for the same product. In both instances, however, the courts are
52For example, see Adelman's comments on the Brown case, op. cit. supra note
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concerned with the degree to which products actually are meaningful alternatives for each other.
The rivalry for custom which is the essence of competition takes
place by offering substitutes or alternative products to buyers. Thus
either doctrine can determine the supply and demand relationships
for a group of firms, if price relationships as well as technical possibilitiesare examined. The significant difference between market definition and antitrust cases is not the doctrine applied, but whether
price data as well as engineering or technical data are analyzed. If one
examines only engineering possibilities there is almost always a wide
range of choices open to the decision maker. The choice actually made
will be strongly influenced by the relative costs of the technical alternatives. Therefore, when price data is examined the meaningful alternatives, or relevant choices, may be significantly limited. Put another
way, when cost data is examined the market boundaries can never be
broader than those established by examination of technical possibilities of substitution and will frequently be narrower.
Those decisions in which judicial attention focused primarily on
technical substitution have been the ones most criticized by economists.
Examples are Cellophane, Times-Picayune, and Brown Shoe. In the
instances in which the courts have weighed price as well as engineering data, the market definitions have more nearly corresponded to
what most economists consider the effective zone of competition. Examples are Kobe Pump, Hughes, and American Crystal Sugar. The
significant differences, from an economic standpoint, between market
definition in antitrust cases are not in the legal doctrine applied but
in the extent to which the costs of substitutes are examined.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although there are two separate doctrines applied to market definition in antitrust cases-functional interchangeability and peculiar
characteristics and uses-from an economic viewpoint there are great
similarities between them. Both hold that markets must be defined by
examining substitution possibilities. Skillfully applied, either can
delineate the applicable supply and demand relationships. The significant difference between judicial handling of the problem of establishing market boundaries is not which doctrine is used but whether
economically advantageous alternatives are investigated as well as
technically feasible possibilities. The use or rejection of price-quantity
data is the important distinction.
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The courts in both Sherman and Clayton Act cases are concerned
with applying economic theory to empirical problems. This is an exceedingly difficult task. The last' twenty years have seen an increasing
sophistication in judicial thinking about this problem and much improvement in the quality of the economic criteria applied. Nevertheless, as this review shows, there is still much room for improvement
and there is still much confusion over the appropriate procedures for
determining market boundaries.
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